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T~m general provisions of the Charter conferring functions upon
the United Nations and obligations upon its members are subject to
important restrictions concerning matters of domestic jurisdiction
(Article 2, Paragraph 7), the right of self-defense (Article 51), and
action in relation to former enemy states (Articles 53 and 107).
Do3imsTIc JURISDICTION
Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter reads as follows:
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members
to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter;
but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VIi." I
This paragraph comprises tvo different rules: one prohibiting inter-
vention on the part of the Organization in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state; another releasing
the members to submit such matters to settlement under the Charter.
The broad prohibition applies against intervention by the whole of
the international organization or by any subdivision thereof. The
Report to the President correctly states, "The proviso with reference
to domestic jurisdiction becomes a limitation upon all of the activities
of the Organization rather than merely a limitation upon the action of
the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter. ." 2
.
Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter does not refer expressly to
disputes, but is phrased more generally to include all "matters."
However, disputes which involve questions of domestic jurisdiction
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1. In a statement on Art. 2, 7, UNCIO Doc. 929, 1/1/37 (1945) 1, the Delegate of
Norway said, "It is tantamount to imposing on the worling of the syztem of international
investigation and conciliation very severe limitations and thus to expozing the psace of the
world to dangers, the extent of which it is difficult to assess in advance. One is reminded of
the caustic remark of Elihu Root, 'The people of the State of New York are in favor of pro-
hibition, but against the application of it.'" See UNCIO Doc. 1019, 1/1/42 (1945) 1;
UNCIO Doc. 976, 1/1/40 (1945) 1.
2. Report to the President on The Results of te San Frarisco Conference by the Sezrdary
of State, DEP'T OF STATE CONFEPENCE SER. No. 71 (June 26, 1945) 43 (hereinafter cited as
Report to the Presdent).
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are manifestly within the operation of the paragraph, since only dis-
putes could be matters submitted to settlement. The essential content
of the paragraph has been taken over from Article 15, Paragraph 8 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations:
"If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and
is found by the Council, to arise out of a matter which by interna-
tional law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party,
the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as
to its settlement."
The idea underlying this exclusion in both Charter and Covenant
is that certain matters by their very nature are within the domestic
jurisdiction of the states, and that a dispute which arises out of such
a matter is an internal or domestic affair, involving no "international"
relation, and so not calling for an international agency competent to
settle the dispute. There can be little doubt that this basic idea is
erroneous, whether it be particularized to mean "solely" or "essen-
tially" within domestic jurisdiction.
The Covenant excluded from League determination disputes "solely"
within domestic jurisdiction. However, there is no matter that cannot
be regulated by a rule of customary or contractual international law,
and if a matter is regulated by a rule of international law, it is no
longer "solely within the domestic jurisdiction" of the state concerned.
Matters solely within domestic jurisdiction are only those which, for
the time being, are not being regulated by a rule of international law.
But when a dispute between two states arises out of a matter which,
according to the opinion of one of the parties, is solely within its do-
mestic jurisdiction, the dispute is nevertheless an international dispute,
and should be amenable to the established processes of international
:settlement. Even if the international agency (such as the Council
under Article 15, Paragraph 8 of the Covenant) be competent only
to decide the question whether the matter in controversy is solely
within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the disputants, the decision
is the settlement of a true international dispute. For an adjudication
upholding a state's claim of exclusive domestic jurisdiction decides
that the other state may not, under international law, interfere in the
matter. A contrary decision means that the state which opposes its
domestic jurisdiction to the other party's claim is wrong, according
to international law, a.t least in so far as the jurisdictional objection
is not justified. Consequently, the power to determine when a dis-
puted matter is solely within domestic jurisdiction implies the power
to settle the dispute.
Substitution of "essentially" for "solely" to limit the scope of
domestic'jurisdiction does not rectify the error. One state's claim that
a contested matter is within its domestic jurisdiction may give rise to
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an international dispute under either terminology. Just as there are
no matters which, by their very nature, are "solely" within the do-
mestic jurisdiction, so there are no matters which by their nature are
"essentially" within that jurisdiction. The fact that such matters as
form of government, acquisition or loss of citizenship or immigration
are not normally regulated by a rule of international law is no reason
to assume that they are "essentially" within the jurisdiction of states;
they can be the object of treaty. From this it follows that the question
is not the nature of a disputed matter but whether customary or con-
tractual international law has left the matter solely within domestic
jurisdiction, 3 or has subjected states to international obligations in the
matter. (Thus the omission of reference to international law in Article
2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter effects no material change from Article
15, Paragraph 8 of the Covenant.) In marked contrast to the Cove-
nant, the Charter does not contain a provision conferring on any organ
power to determine whether a matter is -within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of a state. Consequently, the provision that a member is not
obliged to submit a matter which is essentially within its domestic
jurisdiction to settlement under the Charter may be interpreted to
mean that the member itself has the power to decide whether the
matter is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction. If this interpre-
tation is accepted, then replacement of the term "solely" by the term
"essentially" marks further deviation from the Covenant, since a
member may claim "essentially" domestic jurisdiction even though
the matter is regulated by international law and an allegation of
"solely" domestic jurisdiction would be untenable.4
3. At the Seventeenth Meeting of Committee I/I, UNCIO Doc. 1019, I!1/42, at 5,
the Belgian Delegate said that an international treaty does not automatically bring its
substance into the realm of international law.
4. During the discussion of Art. 2, v 7, at the Seventeenth Meeting of Committee I/l,
UNCIO Doc. 1019, 1/1/42 (1945) 5 et seg., the Delegate of Australia declared with regard
to the substitution of the word "essentially" for "solely," that he agreed ith the opinion,
expressed previously by the Delegate of the United States, "that matters sokly within
domestic jurisdiction were constantly contracting. For example, international agreement
to promote full employment would have been unheard of a few years ago and even now,
although this matter remained within domestic jurisdiction, it was not 'solely' vithin domes-
tic jurisdiction. It was, however, 'essentially' within domestic jurisdiction and that was a
better criterion to apply." Consequently, in spite of the fact that a dispute refers to the
obligation assumed by an international treaty, an intervention in this dispute on the part
of the Organization is excluded if the international obligation refers to a subject matter
which is "essentially" within the domestic jurisdiction. Since this can be said of almost
every subject matter, Art. 2, , 7 may be used as an instrument to paralyze an important
part of the activity of the Organization.
The Report to the President at 45, justifies the replacement of the term "solely" by the
term "essentially" as follows: "It seemed more appropriate to look to what was the czEnce,
the heart, of the matter rather than to be compelled to determine that a certain matter was
'solely' domestic in character." Neither by its very nature nor for the reason that inter-
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The stipulation of Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter that, where'
disputes arise from matters within domestic jurisdiction, members
are not obliged to submit such disputes "to settlement under the
present Charter" ostensibly means that they are not obliged to refer
such disputes to the Security Council (Article 37, Paragraph 1) and
are not obliged to accept intervention in such disputes on the part of
the General Assembly (Articles 10, 11) or of the Security Council
(Article 33, Paragraph 2; Articles 34, 36) or even of the International
Court of Justice (Article 36, Paragraphs 2-6 of the Statute).' How-
ever, the stipulation is broader than if it had read "to submit such
matters to settlement through organs of the United Nations." Ac-
cordingly, the domestic jurisdiction clause may be interpreted to mean
that members are not obligated to settle such disputes by peaceful
national law does not establish certain obligations with respect to it, a mitter is "essentially"
domestic in character. As far as the reference to "international law" is concerned, which
c. VIII, § A, 7 of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals had taken over from Art. 15, 8 of the
Covenant, but which in the text of Art. 2, 7 of the Charter has been dropped, the Report
to the President at 44 et seq. states, "This deletion was supported by the argument that the
body of international law on this subject is indefinite and inadequate. To the extent that
the matter is dealt with by international practice and by text writers, the conceptions are
antiquated and not of a character which ought to be frozen into the new Organization." As
to the question whether a rule of general customary international law or an international
treaty imposes upon the state which considers a matter to be within its domestic jurisdic-
tion a definite obligation with respect to this matter, "the body of international law" is
neither "indefinite" nor "inadequate." The question, as to whether a State is under an
obligation imposed upon it by international law, is to be answered in almost afiy dispute.
If the "body of international law" were really so "indefinite and inadequate" that it would
be justified to ignore it, no dispute could be decided in accordance with international law.
5. The wording of Art. 2, 7 does not prevent a state which has declared, under
Art. 36, 2 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, that it recognizes as com-
pulsory the jurisdiction of the Court in the legal disputes referred to in this paragraph from
declining the jurisdiction of the Court by claiming that the dispute arises out of a matter
which is essentially within the domestic jurisdiciion of that state. The only question is
whether, in case the other party contradicts this view, paragraph 6 of Article 36 applies
providing that the Court shall settle the matter. Even if the answer is in the affirmative,
the Court is bound by Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter and consequently has to recog-
nize a matter to be essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the state which, under
this provision of the Charter, declares the matter to be essentially within its domestic juris-
diction. That means that Article 2, paragraph 7 of the Charter may deprive a declaration
made under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute of almost all its value.
The Resolution 196 adopted by the United States Senate on August 2, 1946 (Congres-
sional Record, Vol. 92, No. 154, p. 10850), authorizing the President of the United States
to deposit with the Secretary-General of the United Nations a declaration under paragraph 2
of Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, contains the provision that
the declaration shall not apply to "disputes with regard to matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United States."
This provision is in conformity with the Charter. Even without it, the declaration of the
United States made under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute could not have the effect
to oblige the United States to submit to the Court a legal dispute which the United States
considers to refer to a matter essentially within its own domestic jurisdiction.
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means, in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 2, Para-
graph 3 of the Charter. Such an interpretation could be reinforced
by reference to the basic idea that a matter within domestic jurisdic-
tion of a state cannot give rise to an "international" dispute, while
Article 2, Paragraph 3 obligates members to settle by peaceful means
only their "international" disputes.
It is true that in Chapter VI, entitled "Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes," Articles 33 to 38 refer to "disputes" and not to "international
disputes." However, it might be maintained that, after Chapter I of
the Charter established the kind of disputes which are to be settled by
peaceful means (namely, "international" disputes in the sense of
Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 7), it was deemed superfluous to repeat
in the subsequent Chapters the adjective "international," since it
was considered to be self-evident that the disputes referred to in sub-
sequent Chapters, and especially in Chapter VI, are the same as those
referred to in Chapter I.
To carry the argument further: if a dispute is not "international,"
then the relation between the disputing states is not an "international"
relation;6 therefore the principle that members shall refrain from
threat or use of force "in their international relations" (Article 2,
Paragraph 4) does not apply where the dispute arises out of a matter
which is within the domestic jurisdiction of one of the disputants;
consequently, members may settle such disputes by threat or use of
force.
Textual deficiencies in the Covenant of the League of Nations posed
the question whether, under Article 15, Paragraph 8, states were
allowed to resort to war to settle a dispute which arose out of a matter
solely within the domestic jurisdiction of one party. It was possible to
argue: since Article 15, Paragraph 8 does not expressly forbid war-
as the Covenant does in Article 15, Paragraph 6-the parties are
allowed to resort to war. It was also possible to argue: since Article 15,
Paragraph 8 does not expressly allow war-as does Article 15, Para-
graph 7-the parties are forbidden to resort to war. The latter inter-
pretation could be further strengthened by the argument that asser-
tion of domestic jurisdiction constituted a valid defense to a disputed
claim only if confirmed by the Council. Such confirmation implied
that the party asserting domestic jurisdiction was right, and demands
by the other party were unjustified. It would be absurd for the Cove-
6. With reference to Art. 2, T 7, the Delegate of Australia expre zcd the opinion that
an organization "that is genuinely international in character" should not be permitted "to
intervene in those domestic matters in which, by definition, international law prmits each
state entire liberty of action." UNCIO Doc. 969, 1/1139 (1945) 2. He spoke of "a matter of
legitimate 'international' and not merely of 'domestic' concern." Id. at 4. Thus he inter-
preted the term "domestic" to mean the opposite of "international."
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nant to authorize a member to resort to war against another member
whose right had been sustained by a decision of the Council.
Unlike the Covenant, the Charter does not undertake to authorize
or prohibit war in stated circumstances, but contains a general prohi-
bition of the use of force. Consequently, the use of force may be con-
sidered as allowed only if an exception to this rule is expressly stipu-
lated. As indicated previously, Article 2, Paragraphs 3, 4 and 7 may
be interpreted as establishing such an exception with respect to dis-
putes arising out of matters within the domestic jurisdiction of a state.
Furthermore, since the Charter does not empower any international
agency to decide whether the subject matter of the dispute is within
domestic jurisdiction, it appears that if one party to a dispute declares
the matter out of which the dispute has arisen to be essentially within
its domestic jurisdiction, the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the
United Nations.7 It is, therefore, possible to conclude that Article 2,
Paragraph 7 establishes the circumstances in which members may use
force without violating the Charter.
So interpreted, Article 2, Paragraph 7 probably goes much further
than the intention of those who drafted it." It is very likely that the
authors of the Charter did not intend that Paragraph 7 should release
7. At the Seventeenth Meeting of Committee I/1, UNCIO Doc. 1019, 1/1/42, at 3,
the Delegate of Greece declared "that the basic issue was one of determining what was
domestic jurisdiction; his Delegation felt that the International Court was the body which
should determine this matter." He suggested the following amendment: "It should be left
to the International Court of Justice at the request of a party to decide whether or not such
situation or dispute arises out of matters that under international law fall within the domes-
tic jurisdiction of the State concerned." In reply to the arguments advanced in favor of the
Greek amendment, Mr. Dulles (U.S.A.) commented that "disputes involving interpretation
were not peculiar to Art. 8, and that it was unnecessarily limited to place the proposed revi-
sion in one article. For example, Art. 5 of Chapter II stated that the 'Organization shall
give every assistance,' but there might be a question as to what constituted 'every assistance'
or whether a state was giving 'every assistance.' Shall it be the Court or the Council? Some
body would have to determine questions such as this. The committees of Commission IV
had been studying this very type of problem, but they were not prepared to say that all
matters of this kind should be referred to the International Court for settlement. It would
hardly seem possible or desirable to introduce into Chapter II the principle of 'compulsory
jurisdiction' for the Court when another branch of the Conference had rejected this principle
as impractical of adoption at the present time." For the Belgian Delegate's suggested formu-
lation of Art. 2, 7, see id. at 4; for reasons behind Uruguay's vote in favor of Greek
and Belgian proposals, see UNCIO Doc. 1167, 1/10 (1945) at 3.
8. The Report to the President at 45, states, "It is quite conceivable that there might
be an international dispute with reference to such matters as tariff, immigration, or the like,
but where such a dispute relates to matters which are essentially domestic in character,
settlement through international processes should not be required." Does this follow even
if an international treaty imposes upon one party to the dispute a definite obligation with
respect to the tariff or immigration matter which is the object of the dispute? If the dispute
is "international," why should settlement through international processes not be required?
See UNCIO Doc. 969, I/1/39 (1945) 3 et seq.
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members from the obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force
in the settlement of a conflict arising out of a matter -hich, in the
opinion of a member, is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction.
Probably it was only intended to release the member from its obliga-
tion to submit the dispute to the Secunty Council. However, if such
was the intention, it does not appear in the text of the Paragraph.
After the categorical exclusion of any intervention on the part of the
United Nations in matters .essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state, Article 2, Paragraph 7 declares "but this principle shall
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chaptcr
VII." Since enforcement measures under Chapter VII constitute the
most extreme methods of intervening in the affairs of the members,
this clause must be interpreted as restricting the basic principle of
non-intervention in the domestic sphere. The question now becomes:
what acts of intervention are permitted? Does "enforcement meas-
ures" mean only measures involving the use of armed force, as deter-
mined in Article 42, or does the term include measures taken in ac-
cordance with Article 41, not involving the use of armed force? It
is probable that the latter interpretation corresponds to the intention
of those who drafted the Charter. If so, the following acts of inter-
vention are excluded by Article 2, Paragraph 7: recommendations of
the General Assembly (Article 10; Article 11, Paragraph 2; and Ar-
ticle 14); calling upon the parties on the part of the Security Council
to settle their disputes by peaceful means of their own choice (Article
33, Paragraph 2); investigation of the dispute or situation by the Se-
curity Council (Article 34); determination by the Security Council
whether the continuation of the dispute or situation is likely to en-
danger the maintenance of international peace and security (Article
34); recommendation of appropriate procedures or methods of adjust-
ment by the Security Council (Article 36, Paragraph 1; Article 37,
Paragraph 2); recommendation of terms of settlement by the Security
Council (Article 37, Paragraph 2); determination by the Security
Council of the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace,
or act of aggression and recommendations applying thereto (Article
39) ;9 and preventive measures (i.e., calling upon the parties to comply
with provisional measures) by the Security Council (.Article 40).
There can be no doubt that the continuation of a dispute arising
9. According to the amendment suggested by the sponsoring governments, the second
sentence of Art. 2, I 7 reads as follows: "But this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion of chapter VIII, Section B [of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Chapter VII of the
Charter]." Under this provision, recommendations under Art. 39 were po rible. In order to
exclude such recommendations, upon a motion of the Australian Delegation, the wvords
"application of Chapter VIII, Section B" vere replaced by the words "enforcement measures
under Chapter VIII, Section B." Compare Amendment by the Australian Delegation to
Proposed Paragraph 8 of Chapter II (Principles), UNCIO Doc. 969, 1/1/39 (1945).
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out of a matter which, according to the opinion of one of the contesting
parties, is essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, may endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security. However, if
Article 2, Paragraph 7 is taken literally, the Security Council is not
allowed to investigate such a dispute to determine whether its con-
tinuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security, pursuant to Article 34, since this is not an enforcement
measure, although the Security Council may decide to take enforce-
ment measures pursuant to Articles 41 and 42. This interpretation of
Article 2, Paragraph 7 is further reduced to absurdity by consideration
of Article 39, which reads:
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
international peace and security."
This Article must be interpreted to mean that, before making recom-
mendations or deciding upon measures under Articles 41 and 42, the
Security Council must determine the existence of a threat to the peace,
a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression. Such determination is
not, in itself, an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, and so out-
side the permitted field of intervention in matters within domestic
jurisdiction.
In the light of this analysis, it seems hardly possible to interpret
literally the final clause of Article 2, Paragraph 7. If intervention by
enforcement measures under Chapter VII in matters of domestic
jurisdiction is allowed, then, logically, intervention by determining
the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression in such matters of domestic jurisdiction must be allowed as
well. Apparently, therefore, the word "enforcement" in the clause is
superfluous since the Security Council may take other than merely
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
Accordingly, it appears that the Security Council in matters of
domestic jurisdiction is allowed to determine the existence bf a threat
to the peace, but is not allowed to investigate a dispute to determine
whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security; is allowed to take enforcement action,
but is not allowed to recommend procedures or methods of adjust-
ment and terms of settlement. Whether such tenuous distinctions can
be observed in practice remains to be seen. The enforcement measures
under Chapter VII are probably intended to be "sanctions," similar
to the enforcement measures provided by Article 16 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations. However, the enforcement measures au-
thorized by the Charter go beyond the legal concept of sanctions as
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reactions against violation of obligations and tend toward being po-
litical measures. The conditions under which the Security Council
is authorized to take enforcement measures, especially the condition
formulated as "threat to the peace," are not identical with a member's
violation of its obligation to refrain from threat or use of force (Article
2, Paragraph 4). As a "threat to the peace," the Security Council may
consider conduct of a member which is neither a threat or a use of
force as, for instance, non-compliance with a recommendation of the
Security Couhcil or of the General Assembly, although such non-
compliance does not violate obligations of the member expressly stipu-
lated by the Charter. If the Security Council has determined thf-
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggres-
sion-and in this determination it is untrammeled by definitions-, it
may take enforcement action in whatever direction it deems necessary
to maintain or restore peace; the Charter does not bind the Security
Council to direct enforcement action only against a state which has
violated its obligation to refrain from threat or use of force, or even only
against a state which is guilty of a threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression. If the interpretation of Article 2, Paragraph
7 already outlined is accepted, a member which, in a dispute arising
out of a matter of domestic jurisdiction, does not submit the matter
to settlement under the Charter but settles the dispute by threat or
use of force, does not violate an obligation imposed upon it by the
Charter, but nevertheless exposes itself to enforcement action taken
by the Security Council-not as a legal sanction, but as a political
measure.
Under Article 2, Paragraph 7, as well as under Article 39, the Or-
ganization is authorized, but not obliged, to intervene with enforce-
ment measures in matters of domestic jurisdiction. Consequently, the
Security Council may, for political or other reasons, refrain from inter-
vening even in case of threat or use of force. In general, inactivity of
the Security Council does not justify resort to self-help by the parties
to a conflict. Under Article 51 they are allowed to do so only as reac-
tion against "armed attack." If, however, the conflict arises out of a
matter which is within the domestic jurisdiction of a state, and if the
members are not obliged to refrain from threat or use of force in
matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction, then
any party to the conflict may resort to self-help without violating the
Charter, even before being attacked.
Furthermore, as Article 2, Paragraph 7 now stands, conflicts which
arise out of a matter of domestic jurisdiction may remain in legal
stalemate unless the disputants resort to arms. If a member refuses to
settle a dispute under Article 33, Paragraph 1, claiming the matter to
be essentially within its domestic jurisdiction, and if the other party
nevertheless refers the dispute to the Security Council under.Article 37,
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Paragraph 1, the Council can intervene only if it assumes the power to
decide whether the matter is essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of the member so claiming. Such assumption of power would be
in disregard of the words of the Charter.
However, if the enforcement measures provided in Chapter VII are
intended to be legal sanctions, one may assume that the members are
not only under the obligation to "refrain from the threat or use of
force" (Article 2, Paragraph 4) but also under the obligation to refrain
from any action which may be considered by the Security Council to
be a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression"
(Article 39). The latter obligation, as a condition to use of enforcement
measures, would be broader than the former and not subject to the
distinction between "international relations" and "domestic matters."
The consequence of such an interpretation would be that even in a
matter of domestic jurisdiction the obligation to refrain from any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression would
prevail. If it is further assumed that the Security Council, in spite of
the wording of Article 2, Paragraph 7, is authorized to determine the
violation of this obligation in case of a dispute arising out of a matter
of domestic jurisdiction, the Security Council may consider refusal to
settle the conflict by pacific means (Article 33, Paragraph 1) as a
"threat to the peace" and take enforcement action against the member
concerned. It is obvious such an interpretation would largely neu-
tralize the effect of Article 2, Paragraph 7.
The general prohibition against intervention in matters of domestic
jurisdiction may be of great importance in relation to the functions of
the Organization under Chapters IX and X. Article 55 authorizes the
United Nations to promote:
"a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions
of economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation;
and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion."
Article 62, Paragraphs 1 and 2 provide:
"1. The Economic and Social Council may make or initiate
studies and reports with respect to international economic, social,
cultural, educational, health, and related matters and may make
recommendations with respect to any such matters to the General
Assembly, to the Members of the United Nations, and to the spe-
cialized agencies concerned.
2. It may make recommendations for the purpose of promoting
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respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental free-
doms for all."
It is hardly possible to fulfill these functions effectively without
intervening in matters of domestic jurisdiction. Further, under Ar-
ticle 56 the members are obliged "to take joint and separate action in
cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes
set forth in Article 55." These provisions are hardly consistent with
Article 2, Paragraph 7.10
SELF-DEFENSE
Although the right of self-defense is presumably established by a rule
of general international law which has the character of jits cogens so
that it cannot be affected by any treaty, it was considered not super-
fluous to stipulate this right expressly in the Charter. Neither the
Covenant of the League of Nations nor the Pact of Paris 11 contained
an analogous provision. Article 51 of the Charter runs as follows:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
10. In the Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Reltions, United States Snate, on
the Charter of the United Nations (hereinafter cited as Hearings) (1945) 307, Mr. Pasvo ky,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, made the following statement: "The language of
chapter IX is very strong and very far-reaching; and questions were raised in the discussion
as to whether or not the language used could in any way be interpreted as meaning interfer-
ence in the domestic affairs of the Member States. It was quite clear that the principle re-
garding domestic jurisdiction already inserted in the Charter would be governing. However,
in view of the importance of this particular question, the committee agreed to include in it-,
records the following statement: 'The Members of Committee 3 of Commi zion II are in full
agreement that nothing contained in chapter IX can be construed as giving authority to the
OrganizAtion to intervene in the domestic affairs of Member States.'" That means that
Committee 11/3 interpreted Art. 55 as being restricted by Art. 2, c 7, but an interpretation
according to which Art. 2, 9 7 is restricted by Art. 55 is not excluded. In the Hearings Sena-
tor Millikin asked, "I notice several reiterations of the thought of the Charter that the
Organization shall not interfere with domestic affairs of any country. How can you get into
these social questions and economic questions without conducting investigations and mak-
ing inquiries in the various countries?" To this Mr. Pasvolsky answered, "The question of
what matters the Organization would be concerned ,.ith would depend upon whether or not
they had international problems. International problems may arise out of all Eorts of cir-
cumstances."
The ensuing discussion showed clearly that the principle of non-intervention in domestic
affairs--however this concept may be defined-is hardly compatible with the functions the
Charter confers upon the Organization in cc. IX and X.
11. In his speech of March 15, 1928, before the Council on Foreign Relations, New
York (published as Special Supplement to [1928] 6 FoREIG.W AFFIRS, Spec. Supp. No. 3)
Mr. Kellogg declared, "This right [of self-defense] is so inherent and univeral that it was
not deemed necessary even to insert it expressly in the treaty."
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and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsi-
bility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at
any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or
restore international peace and security."
This provision presupposes the existence of the right of self-defense
as established not by positive international law but by natural law,
for it speaks of an "inherent" right. This is a theoretical supposition
of the legislator which has no legal importance since the effect of
Article 51 would not change if the term "inherent" were dropped. By
declaring that nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right
of self-defense, the Charter confers such right upon the members,
whether or not established by positive general international law or by
natural law. In this connection, the right of self-defense means the
authorization of the merhbers to use force in order to defend themselves
against an armed attack. However, the Charter does not consistently
maintain the presupposed idea of an "inherent" right of self-defense,
which cannot be altered by positive law. For the Charter both extends
and limits the availability of self-defense.
The right of self-defense, according to the natural law doctrine, is
the right of an individual or a state to defend his person, property, or
honor against a real or imminent attack. It is a right of the attacked
or threatened individual or state, and of no other individual or state.
Article 51 confers the right to use force not only upon the attacked
state but on other states which unite with the attacked state in order
to assist it in defense. If this is the meaning of the term "collective
self-defense," the term is not quite correct, for the Charter authorizes
collective "defense," but not collective "self-defense." Collective
defense exists when two or more states conclude a treaty obliging or
authorizing the contracting parties to assist one another in case one of
them is attacked by a third state. The action on the part of the states
which are not attacked but only assist the attacked state against its
aggressor is not exactly "self"-defense.
According to Article 51 treaties of assistance for the purpose of
collective defense are allowed. The action characterized by Article 51
as "collective self-defense" may be a collective enforcement action,
organized by such treaties of assistance, to be taken against the state
guilty of an armed attack against one of the contracting parties. Such
enforcement action may be very similar to the enforcement actions
which the Security Council is authorized to take against aggressors
under Article 39.
The wording of the first sentence of Article 51 seems to authorize
such treaties of assistance to be concluded not only between members
but also between members and non-members. But the second sentence
1008 [Vol. 55. 997
1946] LIMITATIONS ON FUNCTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS 1009
refers only to "measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defense." Hence the interpretation is possible that the term
"collective self-defense" covers only treaties of assistance concluded
between members for the purpose of defense. However, if Article 2,
Paragraph 6 is to be interpreted to mean that the obligation to refrain
from threat and use of force is imposed also upon non-member states,
it may be assumed that the right of self-defense as stipulated in Ar-
ticle 51 cannot be denied to non-members, and that the Security
Council is authorized to ensure that non-members report to the Se-
curity Council, in accordance with the second sentence of Article 51
the measures they have taken in the exercise of this right. For this is
certainly "necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security." That being so, there is no reason to deny to members the
right to conclude treaties of assistance with non-member states for
protection against armed attack.
Such treaties of assistance may be regional arrangements referred to
in Article 52.12 If so, the rule of Article 53, Paragraph 1 that "no en-
forcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council"
must be interpreted not to refer to enforcement actions taken under
Article 51, so that the exception mentioned in Article 53 ("measures
against enemy states") is not the only exception to the rule of that
Article.
It is doubtful whether the term "collective" self-defense necessarily
means that the defense must be organized prior to the aggression by
an international treaty. It is not impossible to interpret the term to
mean that any member is authorized to assist an attacked member in
its self-defense w"ithout having previously concluded with the attacked
state a treaty of assistance.
It is hardly possible to consider the right or the duty of a non-
attacked state to assist an attacked state as an "inherent" right, that
is to say, a right established by natural law. On the other hand, the
Charter restricts the right of self-defense by stipulating that the right
applies only against "an armed attack" and only as long as the Security
12. Such a regional arrangment is the Declaration on Reciprocal Asistance and Amer-
ican Solidarity, the so-called Act of Chapultepec, adopted by the Governments Reprecented
at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, on March 6,
1945. The fourth clause of Part I of this Act reads as follows: "The Governments Repre-
sented at the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace Declare: That in
case acts of aggression occur or there are reasons to believe that an aggrEzioa is being pre-
pared by any other state against the integrity or inviolability of the territory, or against the
sovereignty or political independence of an American State, the States signatory to this
Act will consult amongst themselves in order to agree upon the measures it may be adv-able
to take." However, measures involving the use of force may be taken in conformity v.ith
Art. 51 of the Charter only against an "armed attack," not in any case of aggrez-on or in
case "there are reasons to believe that an aggression is being prepared."
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Council "has not taken the measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security." It is of importance to note that Article 51
does not use the vague term "aggression" but the much narrower con-
cept of "armed attack," which means that merely "imminent" at-
tack or any act of aggression which has not the character of an attack
involving the use of armed force does not justify resort to force as an
exercise of the right established by Article 51.1 The attacked state
and its allies have to stop the use of force as soon as the Security
Council has taken the necessary measures, unless these measures in-
volve enforcement action ordered by the Security Council to be taken
by the attacked state or its allies.
In order to enable the Security Council to take on time the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security, "measures
taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be
immediately reported to the Security Council." Reported by whom?
Probably by the states which have taken the measures. If this is the
intended meaning of the sentence, it would have been correct to say:
the states which exercise this right of self-defense shall immediately
report the measures taken by them to the Security Council, for it is
obviously intended to establish an obligation of the members (and
through Article 2, Paragraph 6, of non-member states) to report to the
Security Council.
The obligation to stop the exercise of the right of self-defense is
conditioned by the requirement that the Security Council first take
"the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
It is significant that Article 51 does not provide "until the Security
Council has taken enforcement action against the state guilty of an
armed attack." The Security Council may take any "ineasures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security,"-"to maintain,"
and-not as it is usually fornulated "to maintain or to restore interna-
tional peace and security," although in case an "armed attack" has
occurred and thus peace has been broken, only "to restore" and not
"to maintain" peace seems to be possible. Who is competent to decide
the question whether the Security Council has taken the measures
''necessary" to maintain international peace and security? The Se-
curity Council exclusively, or the member or members exercising the
right of self-defense? The Charter does not say in the first sentence of
Article 51-as it says in the last sentence-"measures which the Se-
curity Council deems necessary." It does not, therefore, exclude an
interpretation of the first sentence according to which a member is not
obliged to cease to exercise its right of self-defense when it has reported
13. It is therefore hardly possible to interpret Art. 51 to mean that it does not affect
the validity of the Monroe doctrine, a provision expressly inserted in the Covenant of the
League (Art. 21). See Hearings at 649 ef seg.
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to the Security Council and the Security Council has taken measures
-which, in the opinion of the member, are not the measures "necessary
to maintain international peace and security." This interpretation may
be confirmed by the doctrine that the right of self-defense is conferred
upon the states by a rule of general international law which has the
character of jus cogens. The opinion of the victim of the illegal attack
may be quite different from the opinion of the Security Council about
the measures which are "necessary" in the case concerned. It was
probably not the intention of the legislator to confer upon the attacked
member the power to decide whether the measures taken by the Sc-
curity Council are adequate. The idea was probably that a member is
allowed to exercise its right of self-defense until the Security Council
has taken the measures which the Security Council deems necessary
to restore peace. But this idea is not unambiguously expressed in
Article 51.14
Any decision of the Security Council to take measures necessary for
the maintenance or restoration of peace, and especially the decision to
take enforcement measures requires an affirmative vote of seven mem-
bers including the concurring votes of the permanent members (Ar-
ticle 27, Paragraph 3). This provision makes it possible that even in
case of armed attack referred to in Article 51, no decision of the Se-
curity Council can be reached. In case a state which has a permanent
seat in the Security Council is the aggressor, such a decision is practi-
cally excluded. Hence, the right of individual and collective self-
defense as established by Article 51 may play a greater role than might
be expected within an organization whose main purpose it is to make
the exercise of this right superfluous."
Since the exercise of the right of self-defense must, according to the
first sentence of Article 51, cease at the very moment the Security
Council is taking the measures necessary to maintain peace, the pro-
vision of the second sentence that measures taken by members in the
exercise of the right of self-defense "shall not in any way affect the
14. The British Commentary on he Charter of the United Naltons [pr ented by the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Parliament by Command of His Majesty, Cmd.
6666, London (1945) 9] states with reference to Art. 51, "It will be for the Security Council
to decide whether these measures have been taken and whether they are adequate for the
purpose. In the event of the Security Council failing to take any action, or if such action as
it does take is clearly inadequate, the right of self-defence could be invoked by any Member
or group of Members as justifying any action they thought fit to take." If it is for the Se-
curity Council to decide whether the measures taken by it are adequate, it is not puz-ble
that an action taken by the Security Council can be declared (by whom?) as "clearly inade-
quate."
15. At the Twentieth Meeting of Committee III/1, UNCIO Doe. 967, 111/1/43 (1945)
3, the Delegate of the United States observed "that if a major power became the aggrezZor,
the Council had no power to prevent war. In such case the inherent right of Eelf-defense ap-
plied, and the nations of the world must decide whether or not they would go to war."
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authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order
to maintain or restore international, peace and security," seems to be
superfluous. That the Security Council is authorized in case of an
armed attack to take "at any time such action as it deems necessary'
in order to maintain or restore international peace and security," fol-
lows from the first sentence of Article 51. It could be objected that
the first sentence refers only to the "authority," not to the "responsi-
bility" of the Security Council to take at any time such action as it
deems necessary. But the "responsibility" of the Security Council
to take such action is sufficiently established by other provisions of
the Charter (e.g., Articles 24 and 39).
ACTION IN RELATION TO FORM3ER ENEMY STATES
Article 107 constitutes an important restriction on the obligations
of the members, especially on their obligation to refrain from the
threat or use of force, as well as on the functions of the Organization.
This Article runs as follows:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude
action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War
has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or
authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having re-
sponsibility for such action."
The Article refers to action directed against ex-enemy states. Any
action, especially action taken by force forbidden by the Charter, is
not forbidden if directed against an ex-enemy state. This action is
limited in so far only as it should be "a result" of the Second World
War and "taken or authorized by the Governments having responsi-
bility for such action." But what is the meaning of action "taken or
authorized as a result of that war," and which governments have re-
sponsibility for such action? The most reasonable answer to those
questions would be: action authorized by armistice, surrender, or
peace treaties, action for which the states that are parties to these
arrangements have responsibility. But such restriction of the action
referred to in Article 107 is not stipulated." The Report of Committee 3
to Commission III on Chapter XII (Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
corresponding to Chapter XVII of the Charter) contains the following
statement of the Delegate of the United Kingdom: "It would be im-
possible to limit this action, as proposed by the Australian Delegate,
to that decided upon in an armistice, a peace treaty, or a joint declara-
tion like the Declaration of Moscow because responsibility, as envisaged
in Paragraph 2 (of Chapter XII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
16. SeeUNCIO Doc. 765, III/3/39 (1945)4.
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corresponding to Article 107 of the Charter) could fall upon a state
which is party to none of these acts." 17 Another document of this
Committee contains the following statement: "[The United Kingdom
Delegate] . .. said that it would be unwise to limit the definition of
the expression 'Governments having responsibility for such action' to
governments parties to armistice terms, peace treaties, and the Mos-
cow Declaration. It was conceivable that in some cases there would be
no peace treaty and that a government which had not been a party
either to the Moscow Declaration or to an instrument of surrender
might be called upon to assume some degree of responsibility for action
in regard to an enemy state." 11
The result of the negotiations in the Committee was that neither the
formula defining the action referred to in Article 107 nor one delineating
the governments responsible for such action has been inserted in the
text of the Article. According to its wording, any action against ex-
enemy states is permitted to any government, if the action can be
justified as a result of World War II. Since Article 107 does not restrict
the action to action authorized by any special agreement and since no
special authority is designated to decide the question as to whether an
action is to be considered as "a result of the Second World War," the
decision of this question is left to the government which takes the
action or authorizes another government to take it." That means that
the formula "as a result of that war" does not imply any serious re-
striction.
Even the slight restriction established by the phrase "taken or au-
thorized as a result of that war" is eliminated in case enforcement
action is taken against an ex-enemy state under regional arrangements
or by regional agencies. Article 53, Paragraph 1 stipulates,
"The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such (as
referred to in Article 52] regional arrangements or agencies for en-
forcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council, with the excep-
tion of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2
of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional
arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the
part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on
request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the respon-
sibility for preventing further aggression by such a state." -
This Article authorizes regional agencies and states under regional
17. UNCIO Doe. 1095, 111/3/50 (1945) 4.
18. UNCIO Doc. 1161, III/3/53 (1945).
19. UNCIO Doc. 1095, 111/3/50 (1945) 4.
20. Ibid.
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arrangements to act against ex-enemy states as they are authorized to
act by Article 107. In addition to this it authorizes regional agencies
and states under regional arrangements to resort to force against ex-
enemy states for a purpose which is defined by the terms "against re-
newal of aggressive policy." That means: prevent the renewal of ag-
gressive policy as well as react against an actual attempt to renew
aggressive policy. The question as to what circumstances justify such
action against an ex-enemy state has to be decided by the regional
agency or the individual states acting under a regional arrangement.
Such regional arrangement frees the states from the restriction estab-
lished by the terms of Article 107, "as a result of that war;" unless
"renewal of aggressive policy on the part of [an ex-enemy] state" is
considered to be always "a result of that war."
This far-going authorization of regional organizations to resort to
force against ex-enemy states is limited by Article 53 only temporarily,
"until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Govern-
ments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing
further aggression by such a state." It depends on the discretion of
the governments concerned to make such a request. The Organization
is authorized to accept the charge. That such acceptance is required
follows from the use of the term "request." The acceptance of the
request constitutes an agreement between the Organization and the
government making the request. The Charter does not determine the
organ of the United Nations to which the request shall be addressed,
and which is competent to accept it. Since enforcement action is in-
volved, it may be assumed by analogy that the Security Council is
competent to act on behalf of the Organization under Article 53, Para-
graph 1. According to the wording of this provision, the Organization
is authorized to accept the responsibility for preventing further aggres-
sion on the part of the ex-enemy state. That means that the power of
the regional agency or the parties to a regional arrangement to take
bnforcement action against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of
an ex-enemy state may be transferred to the Organization. No such
possibility is provided for with respect to the power, conferred upon
the members by Article 107, to take enforcement action against enemy
states "as result of that war."
It must be noted that the power conferred upon the Organization
by the request accepted under Article 53, Paragraph 1 (to take enforce-
ment action against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of an ex-
enemy state) is greater than the power conferred upon the Organiza-
tion by Article 39 of the Charter. Just as the Government concerned,
the Organization, after having accepted the former's request under
Article 53, Paragraph 1, is not bound to determine the existence of a
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression before
taking enforcement action. Article 53, Paragraph 1 does not refer to
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Article 39. Hence the enforcement action taken by the Organization
under Article 53, Paragraph 1 is not restricted by the provision of
Article 39.
Within the problematic restrictions established by Articles 107 and
53, the members of the United Nations are not obliged by the Charter
to refrain from the threat or use of force in relation to ex-enemy states
and, consequently, not to settle by peaceful means their disputes with
ex-enemy states. The ex-enemy states have all the obligations which
Article 2, Paragraph 6 imposes upon non-member states, but the mem-
ber states have no substantial obligations in relation to the ex-enemy
states. In this respect, the ex-enemy states are, in principle,-' outside
of the law of the Charter. This outlawry is permanent; for according
to the wording of Article 107, it is not terminated by the admission of
an ex-enemy state to the Organization; and the definition of the term
"enemy state" in Article 53, Paragraph 2 applies also to states after
they have become members of the United Nations. All this w,-as prob-
ably not intended and is politically hardly justifiable, but the text of
the Charter does not correspond to the probably more reasonable in-
tention of its authors.
23
21. With the exception of certain rights conferred by Art. 2, 6, Art. 11, 2, Art. 32,
Art. 35, 2, and Art. 50, upon all non-member states, including ex-enemy states. However,
see UNCIO Doc. 1095, 111/3/S0 (1945) 3 et seg.
22. In the Hearings at 303, the question arose as to whether the exception established
by Art. 53, 1 would apply in case a former enemy state would become a member of the
United Nations. Mr. Pasvolsk-v answered this question as follows: "Presumably when any
one of these nations becomes a Member of the Organization, this exception would no longer
apply to it."
23. See Report to th7 President at 164.
